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Theses
1. Tajikistan in its present state has been built on
the civil war experiences and provisions of the
peace accords signed in 1997. These have had 
a great impact on the present form of the state,
its political scene and power mechanisms. Presi-
dent Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in
the state. The political system, which he has co-
created, is based on – unique in this region –
political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic
party), decentralisation (far-going independence
of the regions and relatively limited potential of
the central structures) and compromise as the ba-
sic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has
so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation
of the country. 
2. Since 2002, gradual erosion of the system,
which is due to the president's political offensive
and occurrence of new threats (new forms of
Muslim fundamentalism) has been visible. The
president’s attempts to unilaterally challenge the
existing order may rekindle the old conflicts. The
system’s evolution and reform is necessary, a good
occasion for which should be the 2005 parlia-
mentary elections. 
3. 11th September 2001 and the consequences
thereof, i.e. actions of the antiterrorist coalition
in the region and Tajikistan’s participation in them
has meant a real breakthrough for the country.
Those events have removed the greatest threats
(the Taliban Afghanistan), made the country really
open to the world and cooperation with other
countries that CIS members, raised its prestige
and reinforced its position in the international
arena. Although they have not broken the Rus-
sian domination in the region – especially felt in
Tajikistan – still, they have challenged its mono-
polist position in the fields of security, regional po-
licy, economic activity and domination in terms of
civilisation in the broad meaning of the word.
4. Reinforcement of the country’s internal stabili-
ty (inter alia through adaptation of some democra-
tic mechanisms) and skilful usage of the interest
the powerful states show in Tajikistan is a unique
opportunity for this country’s development. 
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Introduction
Tajikistan, like no other Central Asian republic,
had a very bitter experience of regaining indepen-
dence and undergoing peculiar political, social
and cultural transformation. Nowhere else was
it so dramatic. The threats for the stability of the
entire region, which it used to generate, could not
be compared to anything in the other republics.
Present-day Tajikistan is built on the experience
of the civil war, hard and unprecedented process
of normalisation and post-war (re)construction,
rapidly changing political situation in the re-
gion, which it probably feels the strongest of all
the other post-Soviet Central Asian states. The
country, which until recently was left out of the
way, is coping exceedingly well with its prob-
lems, though the process of normalisation has
not been finished yet and is not free from threats.
One of the key challenges is the strengthening of
the political system, which has so far stabilised
the state, and, in particular, of the mechanisms
of cooperation between the pairs: government –
opposition, centre – regions and state – Islam.
Another important task seems to be complete
usage of the potential of cooperation with other
countries and international organisations inter-
ested in that. Without internal stability and fur-
ther considerable aid from the outside, Tajikistan
has no chance of overcoming the deep economic
and civilisation-related crisis, and no chance for
development. 
I. The internal situation
For Tajikistan the fundamental and constitutive
experience was the civil war (1992–1997), which
at the same time was a war of ideologies (be-
tween the post-Soviet nomenclature and the de-
mocratic-Islamic opposition); a war of the “clans”
(between the elites of particular regions of the
country), a peculiar proxy war for the future of
the Central Asia (where the vision of Russia and,
partly, of Uzbekistan collided with the Muslim
and Afghan vision). The war ended in a compro-
mise between all the parties concerned, which
laid the foundations for a political system that
paid due respect to the interests of its main actors
(the Kulab and Karategina clans; the post-com-
munists and the opposition, etc.). They managed
to do a deal, which does not provide for equal
rights to all the parties but still guarantees some
pluralism and includes safety valves for the sys-
tem1. Despite some crises, this deal (not always
formally) is still working, though increasingly
more authoritarian actions of the president more
and more often put it to the test. Still, maintaining
the spirit of the accords and its institutional evo-
lution is a precondition for the stability of the
state. 
1. The authorities vs. the opposition.
The political system
President Emomali Rakhmonov is the main autho-
rity in Tajikistan. His career – similarly to those of
all the other leaders of contemporary Tajikistan2
– has developed as a result of the civil war, during
which he was the leader of the National Front
(NF). At first, he was treated by his henchmen as
a transition period politician, a puppet in the
hands of Russia and Uzbekistan, a hostage of the
field commanders. However, Rakhmonov appea-
red to be a skilful and, with time, an increasingly
more independent politician. His co-authorship
of the peace accords and the implementation
thereof (which was not free from manipulation)
ensured him a good position on the political scene
and great respect among the Tajik people.
The first and the greatest challenge the president
had to face after the war end (1997) was the pa-
cification of the field commanders, on both the
government and the opposition sides. The pro-
cess was very complex and it could not impair the
interests of the regional, political and business
groups from which particular commanders origi-
nated. Rakhmonov managed to include the oppo-
sition forces in it (e.g. the putting down of colo-
nel Mahmud Khudoberdiev’s revolt in Leninabad
in 1998 with the help of the United Tajik Oppo-
sition (UTO) troops but also crushing the rebel
opposition units). Another, even more important
tool for Rakhmonov was and is the ability to hand
out official posts to representatives of particular
political groups; this way he managed to really
pacify and weaken UTO for a long time, either by
winning some politicians over (as e.g. Hoji Akbar
Turadzhonzoda, who is now deputy Prime Mini-
ster, set at variance with his UTO colleagues), or
by cutting them off their support bases (the nomi-
nations of field commanders coming from Kara-
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tegina to posts in Dushanbe or in other parts of
the country). Such actions were carried out on the
basis of informal arrangements with the oppo-
sition leaders, which met their key interests in
Dushanbe and in the regions. Therefore, the fixing
of the parliamentary and presidential elections
by the authorities, which has limited the politi-
cal representation of the opposition, has only
formally changed the distribution of power. 
As Rakhmonov had become stronger and his
international position gained importance after
11th September 2001 (participation in the anti-
terrorist coalition, fight against fundamentalism,
absolutisation of the category of stability), this
encouraged him to take further steps to eliminate
any opposition. For a start – in 2002 – some limi-
ted detentions among members of the Tajikistan
Islamic Revival Party (TIRP) took place, then
attempts to remove from their posts influential
UTO and former NF politicians were made (e.g.
the cases of Saidsho Shamolov, Qurban Cholov,
Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, Salomsho Mukhabba-
tov, gen. Gaffor Mirzoev – “Sedoy”3 and others).
The process revealed the strength of the post-
war conditions; in especially drastic cases, those
attacked threatened they would use force and re-
ferred to their support bases in the regions, which
made Rakhmonov give up his plans4.
Apart from attacks aimed at particular politicians
(which due to the personalisation of the Tajik
political life and the role of informal pressure is
of key meaning), the president’s camp made the
attempt to legitimise the president’s actions by
offering him the ability of being re-elected (in Ju-
ne 2003, there was held a referendum – strongly
criticised by the opposition – which was won by
the president) and ensuring his camp victory in
the parliamentary (February 2005) and presiden-
tial (2006) elections. The ruling team made a sig-
nificant, yet very controversial step, by ensuring
for itself favourable electoral regulations and
control over the entire electoral process. Although
the outcome of the elections alone is not going
to change the balance of power in the state (it is
based on actual influence, regardless of repre-
sentation in the parliament), still it will block the
process of resolving conflicts by political means
and the chance of reinforcing the structures of
the state. 
2. Islam
Islam, and, in particular, the Islamic fundamen-
talism and terrorism generated by it, is seen as the
greatest threat to the stability of Central Asia as
a whole and of individual countries in the region.
This fight is the official task of all the regional
security organisations, which Tajikistan is a mem-
ber of (including the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organi-
sation). Radical Muslim movements gave rise to
the greatest crises in the region (the civil war in
Tajikistan, the fear of the Afghan Taliban inva-
sion, the Batken crises). This was also the reason
for the serious engagement of the USA in Central
Asia after 11th September 2001. Fight against
fundamentalism is an important tool in the fight
against the opposition, especially in the neigh-
bouring Uzbekistan. 
Huntigton’s paradigm of the clash of civilisations,
the growing fundamentalism in the Muslim
world, the widely publicised by the governments
of Central Asian countries increasing activity of
fundamentalist organisations (e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir),
the terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan in March and
July this year: all these make this question one of
the key factors in the analysis of the situation in
the region and in Tajikistan itself. Tajikistan has
a special position here, as the impact of Islam on
politics has been the strongest here, and the so-
lutions to this issue have been the most “radical”
and unprecedented. Tajikistan, as compared to
the region and, especially, to Uzbekistan, seems to
be a successful yet still unfinished experiment. 
Islam became the most legible ideological base
for United Tajik Opposition groups during the
civil war (1992–1997), which at the same time
gave their opponent a convenient argument to
be used for propaganda purposes. The United
Tajik Opposition had armed troops that openly re-
ferred to Islam: locally the Sharia law was intro-
duced5; such groups used to find temporary shel-
ter in Afghanistan and received technical, milita-
ry and humanitarian assistance and sporadically
cooperated with particular groups there. UTO
troops were accused of taking part in Afghan drug
trafficking, with the main route going via Tajiki-
stan. Its politicians (e.g. Said Abdullo Nuri) many
a time paid visits and received various kinds of
support in Kabul, Kandahar, Tehran6, United Arab
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Emirates and Saudi Arabia. UTO troops became 
a harbour for the Islamic opposition from other
countries of the region, especially from Uzbeki-
stan (Dzhuma Namangani, the terror of Central
Asia, used to be one of the most important com-
manders and staff officers of the civil war period).
Generally, even the end of the civil war did not
mean that the past was automatically written
off: Namangani, with his Uzbeks, was still ille-
gally staying in Tajikistan and creating a new
organisation (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan),
organising armed cross-border raids from this
country to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (the Bat-
ken crises in 1999 and 2000). Finally, he moved
to Afghanistan (2001), where he found shelter
and with his troops he formed the core of Osama
bin Laden’s international brigades fighting
against the intervention of the US-led coalition
in 2001–2002. 
Almost unnoticeably for external observers, all
those problems have basically been resolved in Ta-
jikistan (although there is no guarantee that a pro-
blem will not reappear) and, paradoxically, this
has been achieved by using peaceful methods. 
The compromise between the government and
the opposition (the 1997 Moscow accords) was
achieved owing to the awareness of the impos-
sibility of a military victory, tiredness of the war
and vast destructions, pressure by Russia and Iran
and, indirectly, by the Afghan North Alliance an-
xious of subsequent successes of the Taliban. Pre-
sumably that was a greatly forced and tactical
concession for the government (the authorities
had many a time tried to weaken the implemen-
tation of the accords, still they never went beyond
the boundary of the opposition’s tolerance). The
compromise soon started yielding effects: coope-
ration during liquidation of the renegade com-
manders’ rebellions and, in particular, expelling
Dzhuma Namangani from the country7. 
Doubtlessly, a good way to “pacify” the Islamic
opposition was to give its representatives access
to public life (the legalisation of the opposition
parties, including Tajikistan Islamic Revival Party,
the only legally operating Muslim party in the
region, giving representatives of the opposition
access to the offices, integration of a substantial
part of the Mujahideen into the republic’s law en-
forcement structures). Other safety “valves” in-
cluded mass migrations for economic reasons,
including of the veterans, mainly to Russia, en-
suring far-reaching autonomy to regions tradi-
tionally controlled by the opposition (the Kara-
tegina Valley/Rasht; Gorno-Badakhshan Autono-
mous Oblast (GBAO) and ensuring freedom of
action to foreign non-governmental organisations
and financial institutions (International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, etc.).
The Tajikistan Islamic Revival Party plays a signif-
icant part in Tajikistan; together with other par-
ties of the United Tajik Opposition, it has shown
sufficient political maturity to accept and imple-
ment the peace accords, so it is one of the pillars
of the present system. Its weakening may cause
destabilisation of the entire system. It is only
TIRP that can launch a positive (e.g. programme-
based) fight against radical Muslim movements
(e.g. Hizb ut-Tahrir). After all, such steps have
already been taken for fear of losing public sup-
port8. Characteristic seems to evolution within
the party itself; the once radical slogans have
been replaced with moderate ones, the secular
state is seen as potentially friendly and useful,
the need to strengthen the democratic mecha-
nisms in the country has become a matter of “to
be or not to be” for the party, and increasing the
intellectual level and constant programme-ba-
sed discussion are seen as necessary to deal with
current problems. It seems worthwhile mention-
ing that the party is believed to be inspired by
the programme and practice of the Turkish Party
for Justice and Development (AKP). The changes
in TIRP are usually associated with the strength-
ening of the position of the young Muhiddin Ka-
biri (deputy chairman of the party).
3. New threats
While TIRP is a well-established party in the Tajik
political scene, still a serious and constantly gro-
wing problem is the activity of radical and Pan-
-Islamic organisations, especially of Hizb ut-Tah-
rir al-Islami9, whose objective is the creation of 
a global caliphate, ruled under a peculiarly under-
stood Sharia. The party emphasises the need of
religious and moral revival of the society (hence
the pressure on the development of human re-
sources and structure-building and propaganda
activity) and bitterly criticises any symptoms of
social injustice10. Its strong structures, radical
programme, successes in building of an alterna-
tive society, having its own system of education,
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social aid, etc.; all this causes that the party is
seen as a serious threat to the present socio-poli-
tical system. Even though it formally distances
itself from violence, still there exists a serious
threat that this is only done for propaganda pur-
poses; besides evolution or splitting of the party
into more radical factions cannot be excluded.
This party, active all over Central Asia, had until
recently been considered especially strong among
Uzbeks, which has already changed. In Tajiki-
stan, Hizb ut-Tahrir was at first developing in
the Sughd region (Khodzhent, Isfar, kishlaks in
the province, where – in all probability – it also
inspired the foundation of the radical organisa-
tion Bayat11). Yet, in the recent years, it has be-
come extremely active in Dushanbe and in Kulab
itself (the lair of the former NF, now People’s
Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the clan which
won the civil war). Actions taken by the militia
against it have not given any positive effects,
either; the intellectual frailty of the official and
state-controlled Muslim structures and the
attempts to marginalise TIRP by the state autho-
rities prevent effective ideological response. 
4. The regions
In addition to Islam, Tajikistan has to deal with
the problem of the feuds between the regions, 
a consequence of which is the clan-based system.
Such regional discords and disagreements between
the clans were one of the key causes of the civil
war (the ideological divides in a way, secondari-
ly, overlapped them)12. Even though today the
meaning of the clan divisions is incomparably
smaller than several years ago, still the regional
discords have remained and they still pose a great
challenge to the state. 
Regional divides in Tajikistan are due to the coun-
try’s diversity in terms of ethnics and ethnogra-
phy (e.g. a large percentage of Uzbek population
in Sughd, Pamir peoples in Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Oblast, ethnographical divisions be-
tween various groups of Tajiks), religion (a large
part of GBAO inhabitants are the Shia Ismailis in
contrast to the Sunni majority), geography (mostly
lowland Sughd, and Kulab, and highland Rasht
and GBAO), history (connected with the Fergana
Valley and earlier occupied by the Russians Sughd),
economy, and so on. It is also worth mentioning
problems with communication, which are due to
both geographical (mountains, etc.) and infra-
structural (e.g. devastation of the roads) rea-
sons13. Such factors, as well as the political con-
sequences of the civil war, make the differences
in the situation, directions and tempo of devel-
opment of particular regions really big. Support
in the native region is still an important deter-
minant of the positions of particular politicians. 
Still, it is worth noticing that the authorities in
Dushanbe (first of all, president Rakhmonov),
aware of their own limited capabilities, to a rela-
tively small degree attempt to impose their will
on the regions; and the regions, in turn, are aware
of their weakness in a potential conflict with the
state, of the real lack of an alternative and of the
benefits that the common state provides. 
Paradoxically, the situation is the most difficult
and potentially dangerous for the state in the
regions that have not been affected by military
actions, or even the victorious ones, i.e. in Sughd
and Kulab. 
The main current problems for Sughd include the
lack of due representation on the central level
and the feeling that the oblast administration is
dominated by the Kulab clan. The feeling of alie-
nation from the governing elites and the capital
of the country is even deepened by the problems
with communication14. An additional burden is
the susceptibility to the influence exerted by Uz-
bekistan, which surrounds the Sughd oblast on its
three sides: starting with the development of
Islamic fundamentalism and Hizb ut-Tahrir,
through the crisis in Uzbekistan, which hinders
trade development, and the tightening of Uzbe-
kistan’s borders, and ending with the escalation
of the crisis in that country (after the terrorist
attacks in Uzbekistan this March and July, the
state borders were periodically closed).
The victory in the civil war has had rather nega-
tive effects for Kulab. The victory has led to in-
ternal divides among the camp’s politicians and
commanders, aroused envy and dashed hopes.
Symptomatic of the process is the erosion of the
support base of the president (he comes from
Kulab), who on the one hand has been forced to
make offices available to the opposition and res-
pect the informal autonomy of the regions and
on the other, as a part of reinforcing the state
and his power, he has had to keep a rein on some
of his field commanders and party colleagues. 
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As a result, his closest milieu has shrunk to his
native Dangara, and a new opposition party, Ta-
raqqiyat, which has still not been legalised, emer-
ged out of the Kulab elites. Another negative
effect the civil war has had on the victorious re-
gion has been the preservation of the socioeco-
nomic relations dating back to the early 90’s,
cementing as the local nomenclature has been
strengthening as a result of the war. The fact
that a great part of the arable land has been allo-
cated for cotton cultivation contributes to the
concentration of land and power and to confir-
mation of the feudal-like relations in the region,
which hinders its development and deepens the
frustration among the public. This is probably
one of the main causes of the emergence and
development of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kulab15. 
A peculiar situation has come to existence in the
Rasht Valley. The region has stabilised owing to
the completion of the military actions (which
used to be carried out mainly in this valley), the
memory of which makes the public distrustful to
any sorts of radicalism and conflict resolution by
force. Another positive circumstance has also
been the outflow of a substantial part of people
engaged in the military actions: some of the
commanders have been nominated to offices, a
part of the Mujahideen have been incorporated
in the state law enforcement structures, others
work in Russia. Rasht has maintained an infor-
mal autonomy: local authorities are made up of
local people16. It is still able to grant support to
its people in Dushanbe, which has been proven
by the fight for posts between Mahmadruzi
Iskandarov and Salamsho Muhabbatov17; para-
doxically, cementing the stability built on the
1997 accords. It is characteristic of the situation
in the Rasht Valley (and even to a greater degree
in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast) to be
under an enormous influence of international
and non-governmental organisations conduct-
ing large-scale programmes for activation of the
society, liquidation of the causes and effects of
poverty, infrastructure rebuilding, etc., which
have significantly contributed to actual transfor-
mation on the local level. 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is the re-
gion that stands apart most from the rest of the
country and uses the least conventional solutions.
The region being hardly accessible, located in high
mountains, sparsely populated, inhabited by Pa-
mir and Ismaili peoples (thus differing from the
Sunni Tajiks), the poorest (in the USSR times, it
used to be in 80% supported by central subsidies,
and the influx of refugees during the war even
worsened the poverty problem), bordering the
instable, war-torn Afghanistan, was basically con-
demned to continuous degradation. However,
almost all of those factors have proven benefi-
cial for the region. The relative weakness of the
region made it withdraw fast from active mili-
tary actions and assume “isolationist” positions.
Internally, the region is relatively independent;
the region’s representation in the central struc-
tures is quite weak. There also are some formal
differences: e.g. to enter GBAO you need a special
permit, there is 1 hour time difference between
Dushanbe and GBAO. The role of the region’s spi-
ritual leader (though without a trace of sepa-
ratism or disloyalty to Dushanbe) is played by
Aga Khan IV, the global leader of the Ismaili com-
munity residing in Switzerland, through the
controlled by him network of organisations,
foundations and projects united in Aga Khan De-
velopment Network (AKDN)18. During the war,
AKDN in fact saved Pamir from starving to death,
actively contributed to the signing of the peace
accords; and it has been acting as an agent and
advocate in obtaining aid for Tajikistan from
international institutions. Since the 90’s, using
its dependent institutions and the means of the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and
similar organisations, it has supervised a num-
ber of humanitarian, educational (e.g. the build-
ing of the Central Asian University in Khorog),
social (trainings, professional activation), and
economic projects (micro credits, consulting, co-
financing of e.g. hydroelectric power plants,
roads and bridges – including international –
plants, etc.)19. The scale of changes in GBAO can
be illustrated e.g. by the fact that, with the aid
of AKDN, 90% of the arable land has been priva-
tised and the region has become significantly less
dependent on external supplies. Similar actions
(as mentioned above) are extended over the other
regions of Tajikistan. Still, it is worth emphasis-
ing that, despite the significant and deepening
differences, GBAO is free from any separatist ten-
dencies. 
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II. The socioeconomic problems
A great problem, which projects onto all the other,
is the protracted economic crisis. The fact that
Tajikistan has always been the poorest republic
in the region, the extent of the destruction cau-
sed by the war (including destruction of the
infrastructure, the brain drain), the potential of
instability, the demographic boom, etc. do not
provide good prospects for a radical improve-
ment of the situation. However, worth noticing
is the constant economic growth (approx. 10%)
in the country (owing mainly to the low starting
point) and increasingly more often occurring
prospects of foreign investments in the infra-
structure (e.g. roads, bridges, tunnels, etc.) and
in selected branches of the economy (mainly
hydropower engineering20), and the growing in-
terest of foreign financial institutions. 
Interestingly, the objectively disadvantageous
weakness of the state and its withdrawal from 
a number of social initiatives (programmes for
fighting unemployment, for development of edu-
cation, medical care, etc.) is in contrast with the
great engagement of the non-governmental sec-
tor21 and with the enormous activity of citizens,
which is practically out of the state’s control and
uncovered by the official statistics. The citizens’
enterprise mainly consists in economic migra-
tions; it also takes the form of grey area and cri-
minal activity, especially involving drug smug-
gling22).
1. The economic migrations
It is hard to overestimate the significance, in ma-
ny aspects, of economic migrations for Tajikistan.
It is estimated that since the late 90’s between
600 thousand and 1.5 million of Tajiks (the entire
population of the country being 6 million) annu-
ally emigrate to work (mostly on construction
sites) to Russia alone (Siberian cities, Samara, Mos-
cow)23. It can be assumed that such migrations
provide maintenance to at least half of the coun-
try’s population (especially, if one considers the
number of companies dealing with organisation
of such trips). Estimates show that money from
this source may even three times exceed the cen-
tral budget earnings. At the same time, this is the
most serious tool for Russia to exert pressure on
Tajikistan (hypothetical limitation of migrations
would mean a catastrophe for Tajikistan, which
both sides are well aware of)24. For Tajikistan, this
also has a great meaning in terms of state secu-
rity, as it is for economic reasons that a signifi-
cant part of the former Mujahideen have left the
country. It can be assumed that such a scale of mi-
gration brings about a number of profound cultu-
ral changes: among other things, the traditional
family model has been upset and the role of the
woman at home is changing; there emerges the
need to work for money25. Moreover, contact with
the Russian culture and language, which has be-
come looser because of the war (in contrast, it is
being deliberately limited in the neighbouring
Uzbekistan), is being re-established26. Russia is
for Tajiks the largest, albeit not the only, labour
market. Tajiks travel to Muslim states (the Per-
sian Gulf states, Pakistan, Iran) on a scale incom-
parable to the other Central Asian countries; this
especially concerns business trips and migrations
of qualified specialists (e.g. doctors). This does
not change the fact that the high mobility of the
Tajik society (like nowhere else in the region) is
a consequence of the malfunction of Tajikistan’s
economy. 
III. Tajikistan in the region
At the end of the first decade of its independence
(1991–2001), Tajikistan was a weak, passive and
almost incapacitated state, generating trouble
for its neighbours. Tajikistan’s security and sta-
bility was dependent on Russia’s standpoint (the
real guarantee for the peace accords, protection
from Afghanistan, protection against the expan-
sionism of Uzbekistan). Russia also used to hold
the patronage over almost the entire foreign acti-
vity of Tajikistan, which was limited to its pre-
sence in the structures operating under the aus-
pices of Russia: the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, the Collective Security Treaty, the
Shanghai Five (thereafter the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation) and the like. Russian forces
stationed in Tajikistan were both a guarantee for
the country’s stability and the key Russian point
of military support in the entire Central Asia
and, together with the border guard forces, they
formed one of the last checkpoints on the fron-
tiers of the former empire. At the same time, Ta-
jikistan used to be accused of tolerating or even
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supporting the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 
The instability and internal weakness seemed to
condemn Tajikistan to vegetation. 
1. A breakthrough?
The events that followed after 11th September
2001, the sudden interest by the USA and coalition
members in the region as a part of the planned
operation in Afghanistan and, with time, the
success of the operation and US attempts to en-
sure constant military and political presence in
Central Asia, were a breakthrough Tajikistan
could hardly not appreciate. From the viewpoint
of Washington, as well as of Europe, Tajikistan
appeared as a base for operations in Afghanistan
and an area potentially in danger of fundamen-
talism and terrorism. Almost overnight, it became
the target of visits of high-rank diplomats and
military officials (both US and European), the
place where the coalition troops were stationed
and a beneficiary of financial aid. Moreover, the
fast defeat of the Taliban by the antiterrorist co-
alition suddenly removed the threat of invasion
from the south. In effect, the neighbourhood of
Afghanistan, which used to be a curse for Tajiki-
stan, is now starting to yield benefits. Western
financial institutions are interested in the devel-
opment of the infrastructure on both sides of
the Panj (the border river between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan) to stabilise the situation; hence the
financing of the building of bridges and roads in
the frontier zone and plans to supply electricity
to Afghanistan from the hydroelectric power
plants being built in Gorno-Badakhshan Autono-
mous Oblast. 
This situation has opened Tajikistan to the world,
it has become a school of international politics
for people whose only partners used to be CIS po-
liticians and Afghan field commanders and, last
but not least, it has shaken the dogma of Russian
monopoly on military presence in the region and
guarantee of the region’s security. This process,
in addition to many other consequences, has
been of immense significance for the formation
and maturing of the young Tajik elites. 
The political and military “offensive” of the West
in Central Asia practically ended in 2002. The de-
ployment of military bases in Uzbekistan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan (although Americans are
not present here) set the frontier beyond which
the West, in quality terms, has achieved nothing
more. The defeat of the Taliban (of the state but
not of the forces), the operation in Iraq and the
tension inside the coalition have caused Wa-
shington, whose first ambitions in Central Asia27
have been satisfied, focus its attention on other
regions of the world. Even such limited presence
of the West in Tajikistan (and in the entire re-
gion) has given Dushanbe stronger arguments in
its dealings with Russia, and it has in fact opened
the country to independent cooperation with
other states. 
2. And yet Russia?
Russia, anxious of the profoundness of the chan-
ges in the region, has intensified its activity in
the fields of politics and military tasks, regional
security and economy, inter alia, by reviving the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (founding of
the antiterrorist centre, with its headquarters in
Tashkent) and the Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganisation, causing animation of bilateral coope-
ration, etc. Still, it needs to be stated that Tajiki-
stan has not decided to renounce Russian mili-
tary presence in its territory. 
A great problem in the bilateral relations, in
which Tajikistan took an unprecedentedly hard
stand, appeared to be the conditions of Russian
military presence in the country: the status, fi-
nancing and control of the 201st Mechanised Divi-
sion, which had been planned to be transformed
into a permanent (4th) base (by the way, the lar-
gest Russian tactical unit deployed outside the
Russian Federation borders). Apart from the 201st
Mechanised Division, another problem concerned
the Russian Space Forces complex, the “Okno”
("Window") optoelectronic station in Nurek, for
which Tajikistan demanded special payments. 
The control of the Tajik-Afghan border, which
was being gradually handed over by Russians to
the hosts, appeared to be an additional problem.
Similarly as in the case of the base, Tajikistan
demanded as fast as possible completion of the
Russian mission and handing over control of the
border to it. In this context, regional rivalry was
stirred up, as Dushanbe asked the USA and the
EU for special support in taking over control of
the border; the West positively responded to the
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proposal, yet the pressure exerted earlier by Rus-
sia on Tajikistan prevailed28.
The agreement concluded between Vladimir Putin
and Emomali Rakhmonov on 4th June 2004 (pre-
ceded, inter alia, by the campaign against Tajik
immigrant workers in Russia), regulating some
disputable matters, complied with the Russian
interests, which confirmed that it is Russia which
still has the most potent arsenal to exert pres-
sure on Dushanbe and that it is able to enforce
solutions of strategic importance in the political
and military fields. It should not be expected
that in this regard it will be soon overpowered
by others. The Russian presence in Tajikistan is
shrinking to a narrower and narrower safety
field; the Russian Federation is now forced to ne-
gotiate and carry out concrete actions. Unless
such actions are effective, its place will be gradu-
ally taken by others (this, in particular, concerns
economic issues, which are of interest for other
countries, including China, India and Iran). 
3. The alternatives
The reason why China, Pakistan, India29 and Iran
are interested in Tajikistan is its geopolitical lo-
cation. Firstly, Tajikistan borders Afghanistan, so
it provides for a possibility of conducting an ac-
tive policy there: Iran and India used this occasion
during the war in Afghanistan, supporting the
North Alliance. For China (whose enormous acti-
vity in the entire Central Asia deserves special
attention) Tajikistan is, additionally, a place of po-
tential development of fundamentalism, being
the base for “terrorism” in the neighbouring tur-
bulent Chinese Turkistan; hence the great and ac-
tive role of China in strengthening the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and bilateral initiati-
ves. The situation and Afghanistan and the con-
venient slogan of war on terror is a good occasion
to tighten political and military cooperation be-
tween Tajikistan, Pakistan and India (advanced bi-
lateral projects of coordination centres, manoeuv-
res, military and technical assistance, etc.).
Secondly, Tajikistan has a good location at the
intersection of the East–West and North–South
axes, which either go past Afghanistan or pro-
vide easier access to it. Recently, the first Tajik-
-Chinese border crossing point (Kulma–Karasu30)
has been opened on the East–West axis, which
gives Tajikistan temporary access to the road con-
necting China and Pakistan (Karakorum Highway)
and provides a way out, even if narrow, to the
ports of the Indian Ocean; a new road from Du-
shanbe (crossing the Kulab region) to Khorog is
almost finished. Interest in the renovation of
roads going from Dushanbe through Rasht to
Kyrgyzstan and China is simultaneously expressed
by the EU, China and Iran. The East–West direc-
tion is important both for the countries of the
region, which have poor infrastructure, and for
China and Iran (which are implementing similar
projects in western and northern Afghanistan).
The North–South corridor, apart from its impor-
tance for Tajikistan (the earlier mentioned con-
struction of the tunnel under the Anzob Pass with
the aid of Iranians), also has an immense geopo-
litical meaning. Pakistan has for years been try-
ing to persuade Tajikistan to build a road con-
necting both countries, which would go through
the Vakhan Corridor in Afghanistan (just more
than ten-kilometres-wide, which divides both of
the countries) and, simultaneously, a power sup-
ply main31; implementation of those projects
would create the first direct and relatively secure
corridor connecting Central and South Asia. 
5. Conclusions
Curbing the authoritarian tendencies, encourag-
ing political pluralism and letting the opposition
co-rule the country and institutionalisation of
the informal political mechanisms (as a part of
the “rationed democracy”, an occasion for which
will be the 2005 elections) are necessary to pre-
serve stability in the country and to create a
friendly environment for further development. It
is worth emphasising that in many of Tajiki-
stan’s regions the weakness of the state does not
impede social and economic development sup-
ported by foreign aid (e.g. in GBAO).
Islamic fundamentalism is a very sensitive issue
(especially in the context of its destabilising
potential in Uzbekistan). To succeed in handling
this challenge, a positive alternative needs to be
created. It seems that it will be necessary to
strengthen the moderate Muslim forces (TIRP
and official religious structures) and the local se-
cular elites, as well as to launch a special social
policy in the areas that are particularly suscepti-
ble to fundamentalism.
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The meaning of Tajikistan in the international
scene and the interest in the country shown by
both great Asian powers (China, India, Pakistan)
and Iran, and by the West (USA and EU), is grad-
ually growing. This is not limited just to the
security issue (although the matters of “soft se-
curity” of Tajikistan may become more and more
important for the EU). This also covers infrastruc-
ture-related and economic projects, which pro-
vides a great chance for reconstruction of the
country, gradual overcoming of the crisis and
economic development. 
Krzysztof Strachota
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